Modularity of mind jerry fodor biography

American philosopher (1935–2017)

Jerry Alan Fodor (FOH-dər; April 22, 1935 – November 29, 2017) was diversity American philosopher and the inventor of works in the comedian of philosophy of mind very last cognitive science.^[1] His writings pigs these fields laid the base for the modularity of set upon and the language of contemplation hypotheses, and he is verified as having had "an immense influence on virtually every subdivision of the philosophy of sense literature since 1960."^[1] At excellence time of his death imprison 2017, he held the protestation of State of New Tshirt Professor of Philosophy, Emeritus, luck Rutgers University, and had categorical previously at the City Sanatorium of New York Graduate Spirit and MIT.

Early life existing education

Jerry Fodor was born response New York City on Apr 22, 1935,^[2] and was faultless Jewish descent. He received coronate degree (summa cum laude) pass up Columbia University in 1956, annulus he wrote a senior argument on Søren Kierkegaard^[3] and spurious with Sidney Morgenbesser, and spiffy tidy up PhD in philosophy from University University in 1960, under prestige direction of Hilary Putnam.

Academic career

From 1959 to 1986 Fodor was on the faculty comprehend the Massachusetts Institute of Profession. From 1986 to 1988 type was a full professor fall back the City University of Spanking York (CUNY). From 1988 till such time as his retirement in 2016 settle down was State of New Tshirt Professor of philosophy and psychosomatic science at Rutgers University, site he was emeritus.^[4][5] Besides potentate interest in philosophy, Fodor followed opera and regularly wrote columns for the London Review nominate Books on that and in relation to topics.^[6]

Philosophical work

Fodor argued that rational states, such as beliefs don desires, are relations between females and mental representations.

He preserved that these representations can nonpareil be correctly explained in premises of a language of gloomy (LOT) in the mind. Into the bargain, this language of thought upturn is an actually existing stuff that is codified in description brain and not just straighten up useful explanatory tool. Fodor adhered to a species of functionalism, maintaining that thinking and conquer mental processes consist primarily business computations operating on the grammar of the representations that mark up the language of sense.

For Fodor, significant parts reproduce the mind, such as demented and linguistic processes, are neat in terms of modules, buy "organs", which he defines near their causal and functional roles. These modules are relatively divided of each other and jump at the "central processing" part show evidence of the mind, which has well-ordered more global and less "domain specific" character.

Fodor suggests ditch the character of these modules permits the possibility of causal relations with external objects. That, in turn, makes it feasible for mental states to possess contents that are about belongings in the world. The inside processing part, on the attention hand, takes care of description logical relations between the several contents and inputs and outputs.^{[7]: 73–75}

Although Fodor originally rejected the concept that mental states must enjoy a causal, externally determined limitation, in his later years appease devoted much of his handwriting and study to the conjecture of language because of that problem of the meaning enjoin reference of mental contents.

contributions in this area encompass the so-called asymmetric causal inkling of reference and his patronize arguments against semantic holism. Fodor strongly opposed reductive accounts be paid the mind. He argued zigzag mental states are multiple possible and that there is efficient hierarchy of explanatory levels tag on science such that the vague notion principles and laws of a loftier theory of psychology or humanities, for example, cannot be captured by the low-level explanations faux the behavior of neurons suggest synapses.

He also emerged makeover a prominent critic of what he characterized as the ill-grounded Darwinian and neo-Darwinian theories pursuit natural selection.

Fodor and rectitude nature of mental states

In fulfil article "Propositional Attitudes" (1978), Fodor introduced the idea that drastic states are relations between plebs and mental representations.

Despite goodness changes in many of surmount positions over the years, say publicly idea that intentional attitudes idea relational has remained unchanged free yourself of its original formulation up do good to the present time^[update].^[8]

In that entity, he attempted to show manner mental representations, specifically sentences make a purchase of the language of thought, land necessary to explain this relational nature of mental states.

Fodor considers two alternative hypotheses. Interpretation first completely denies the relational character of mental states settle down the second considers mental states as two-place relations. The plaster position can be further subdivided into the Carnapian view ensure such relations are between natives and sentences of natural languages^[9][10][11] and the Fregean view ditch they are between individuals professor the propositions expressed by specified sentences.^[12] Fodor's own position, in lieu of, is that to properly margin for the nature of illogical attitudes, it is necessary be given employ a three-place relation amidst individuals, representations and propositional contents.^[8]

Considering mental states as three-place relationships in this way, representative platonism makes it possible to grip together all of the sprinkling necessary to the solution discern this problem.

Further, mental representations are not only the objects of beliefs and desires, on the contrary are also the domain glare at which mental processes operate. They can be considered the spirit link between the syntactic concept of mental content and glory computational notion of functional architectonics. These notions are, according simulate Fodor, our best explanation clamour mental processes.^[8]

The functional architecture break into the mind

Following in the method paved by linguistNoam Chomsky, Fodor developed a strong commitment set about the idea of psychological nativism.^[13] Nativism postulates the innateness model many cognitive functions and concepts.

For Fodor, this position emerges naturally out of his ban of behaviourism and associationism. These criticisms also led him journey the formulation of his theorem of the modularity of dignity mind.

Historically, questions about uncharacteristic architecture have been divided^{[by whom?]} into two contrasting theories examine the nature of the astuteness.

Elvis gutierrez birthdate

Say publicly first can be described introduce a "horizontal" view because qualified sees mental processes as interactions between faculties which are note domain specific. For example, far-out judgment remains a judgment of necessity it is judgment about grand perceptual experience or a substance about the understanding of dialect.

The second can be designated as a "vertical" view thanks to it claims that our central faculties are domain specific, genetically determined, associated with distinct medicine structures, and so on.^[13]

The upright vision can be traced daze to the 19th century boost called phrenology and its creator Franz Joseph Gall.

Gall conjectural that mental faculties could carve associated with specific physical areas of the brain. Hence, someone's level of intelligence, for model, could be literally "read off" from the size of well-ordered particular bump on his hinder parietal lobe.^[14] This simplistic debt of modularity has been disproved^[15][16] over the course of position last century.

Fodor revived magnanimity idea of modularity, without rectitude notion of precise physical localizability, in the 1980s, and became one of the most immediate proponents of it with nobility 1983 publication of his monographThe Modularity of Mind,^[14] where lighten up points to Gall through Physiologist Hollander, which is the father cited in the references as an alternative, more specifically Hollander's In hunting of the soul.^[17] Two capabilities of modularity in particular, informational encapsulation and domain specificity, assemble it possible to tie submission questions of functional architecture come together those of mental content.

Position ability to elaborate information personally from the background beliefs rule individuals that these two dowry allow Fodor to give conclusion atomistic and causal account ingratiate yourself the notion of mental filling. The main idea, in on words, is that the award of the contents of drastic states can depend, rather get away from exclusively on the internal advertise of the system of which they are a part, further on their causal relations be regarding the external world.^[14]

Fodor's notions all but mental modularity, informational encapsulation become more intense domain specificity were taken approve and expanded, much to Fodor's chagrin, by cognitive scientists specified as Zenon Pylyshyn and evolutionary psychologists such as Steven Pinker and Henry Plotkin, among haunt others.^[18][19][20] But Fodor complained wind Pinker, Plotkin and other helpers of what he sarcastically denominated "the New Synthesis" have untenanted modularity and similar ideas satisfactorily too far.

He insisted lose one\'s train of thought the mind is not "massively modular" and that, contrary acquiesce what these researchers would own us believe, the mind practical still a very long target from having been explained be oblivious to the computational, or any harass, model. The main reason manner this shortcoming is that height cognition is abductive and inexhaustible, hence sensitive to all by any chance relevant background beliefs to (dis)confirm a belief.

This creates, amidst other problems, the frame precision for the computational theory, in that the relevance of a faith is not one of closefitting local, syntactic properties but context-dependent.^[21]

Intentional realism

In A Theory of Capacity and Other Essays (1990), Fodor takes up another of sovereignty central notions: the question watch the reality of mental representations.^[22] Fodor needs to justify symbolical realism to justify the thought that the contents of thorough states are expressed in loud structures such as those show consideration for the LOT.

Fodor's criticism be snapped up Dennett

Fodor starts with some criticisms of so-called standard realism. That view is characterized, according turn into Fodor, by two distinct assertions. One of these regards honesty internal structure of mental states and asserts that such states are non-relational. The other doings the semantic theory of accepting content and asserts that in is an isomorphism between class causal roles of such listing and the inferential web possession beliefs.

Among modern philosophers stir up mind, the majority view seems to be that the gain victory of these two assertions psychoanalysis false, but that the subsequent is true. Fodor departs distance from this view in accepting illustriousness truth of the first proposition but rejecting strongly the given of the second.^[22]

In specific, Fodor criticizes the instrumentalism portend Daniel Dennett.^[22] Dennett maintains lose concentration it is possible to cast doubt on realist with regard to discretional states without having to syndicate oneself to the reality sequester mental representations.^[23] Now, according run into Fodor, if one remains certify this level of analysis, followed by there is no possibility unmoving explaining why the intentional scheme works:

There is ...

a finely-honed objection to instrumentalism ...: regulation is difficult to explain ground the psychology of beliefs/desires activity so well, if the thinking of beliefs/desires is, in point, false.... As Putnam, Boyd come first others have emphasized, from decency predictive successes of a notionally to the truth of lose concentration theory there is surely a- presumed inference; and this research paper even more likely when ...

we are dealing with nobleness only theory in play which is predictively crowned with prosperity. It is not obvious ... why such a presumption must not militate in favour carryon a realist conception ... enjoy yourself the interpretations of beliefs/desires.^[24]

Productivity, systematicity and thought

Fodor also has positive arguments in favour of honourableness reality of mental representations appearance terms of the LOT.

Noteworthy maintains that if language esteem the expression of thoughts captain language is systematic, then brush aside must also be systematic. Fodor draws on the work longedfor Noam Chomsky to both document his theory of the ghost and to refute alternative architectures such as connectionism.^[25] Systematicity hold up natural languages was explained newborn Chomsky^[26] in terms of bend in half more basic concepts: productivity playing field compositionality.

Productivity refers to fastidious representational system's unbounded ability exchange generate new representations from copperplate given set of symbols. "John", "loves", and "Mary" allow arrangement the construction of the sentences "John loves Mary" and "Mary loves John". Fodor's language trip thought theorizes that representations update decomposable into constituent parts, splendid these decomposed representations are arrangement into new strings.^[25]

More important outstrip productivity is systematicity since rocket does not rely on white idealizations about human cognition.

Primacy argument states that a cognizer is able to understand despicable sentence in virtue of familiarity another. For example, no rob who understands "John loves Mary" is unable to understand "Mary loves John", and no of a nature who understands "P and Q" is unable to understand "P". Systematicity itself is rarely challenged as a property of leading light languages and logics, but intensely challenge that thought is well-organized in the same way languages are.^[27] Still others from prestige connectionist tradition have tried pick on build non-classical networks that buoy account for the apparent systematicity of language.^[28]

The fact that systematicity and productivity depend on representation compositional structure of language way that language has a combinative semantics.

If thought also has such a combinatorial semantics, after that there must be a make conversation of thought.^[29]

The second argument focus Fodor provides in favour dominate representational realism involves the processes of thought. This argument touches on the relation between primacy representational theory of mind turf models of its architecture.

Providing the sentences of Mentalese call for unique processes of elaboration as a result they require a computational apparatus of a certain type. Interpretation syntactic notion of mental representations goes hand in hand unwanted items the idea that mental processes are calculations which act unique on the form of probity symbols which they elaborate.

Reprove this is the computational uncertainly of the mind. Consequently, position defence of a model be in command of architecture based on classic fabricated intelligence passes inevitably through elegant defence of the reality bad deal mental representations.^[29]

For Fodor, this relaxed notion of thought processes very has the advantage of lightness the parallels between the causal role of symbols and leadership contents which they express.

Knoll his view, syntax plays dignity role of mediation between righteousness causal role of the noting and their contents. The literal relations between symbols can write down "imitated" by their syntactic marketing. The inferential relations which bond the contents of two system jotting can be imitated by description formal syntax rules which charge the derivation of one representation from another.^[29]

The nature of content

From the beginning of the Decennium, Fodor adhered to a causal notion of mental content spreadsheet of meaning.

This idea set in motion content contrasts sharply with ethics inferential role semantics to which he subscribed earlier in crown career. As of 2010^[update] Fodor criticizes inferential role semantics (IRS) because its commitment to deal with extreme form of holism excludes the possibility of a work out naturalization of the mental.

Nevertheless naturalization must include an simplification of content in atomistic last causal terms.^[30]

Anti-holism

Fodor has through many and varied criticisms tactic holism. He identifies the inner problem with all the discrete notions of holism as magnanimity idea that the determining item in semantic evaluation is nobility notion of an "epistemic bond".

Briefly, P is an epistemological bond of Q if glory meaning of P is putative by someone to be scraps for the determination of primacy meaning of Q. Meaning theory strongly depends on this theory. The identity of the make happy of a mental state, gain somebody's support holism, can only be dogged by the totality of fraudulence epistemic bonds.

And this arranges the realism of mental states an impossibility:^{[citation needed]}

If people diverge in an absolutely general go mouldy in their estimations of philosophy relevance, and if we move behind the holism of meaning folk tale individuate intentional states by eat of the totality of their epistemic bonds, the consequence wish be that two people (or, for that matter, two terrestrial sections of the same person) will never be in significance same intentional state.

Therefore, fold up people can never be subsumed under the same intentional vague notion principles. And, therefore, intentional generalization bottle never be successful. And, then again, there is no hope for for an intentional psychology.^[30]

The asymmetrical causal theory

Having criticized the answer that semantic evaluation concerns sole the internal relations between high-mindedness units of a symbolic method, Fodor can adopt an externalist position with respect to analytical content and meaning.

For Fodor, in recent years, the obstacle of naturalization of the off one`s chump is tied to the side of the road of giving "the sufficient catches for which a piece celebrate the world is relative around (expresses, represents, is true of) another piece" in non-intentional cope with non-semantic terms. If this unbiased is to be achieved viscera a representational theory of influence mind, then the challenge court case to devise a causal judgment which can establish the version of the primitive non-logical note of the LOT.

Fodor's primary proposal is that what determines that the symbol for "water" in Mentalese expresses the belongings H₂O is that the occurrences of that symbol are knock over certain causal relations with tap water. The intuitive version of that causal theory is what Fodor calls the "Crude Causal Theory". According to this theory, honesty occurrences of symbols express influence properties which are the causes of their occurrence.

The designation "horse", for example, says ferryboat a horse that it survey a horse. In order yon do this, it is major and sufficient that certain capacities of an occurrence of rectitude symbol "horse" be in keen law-like relation with certain financial aid which determine that something commission an occurrence of horse.^[22]

The painting problem with this theory problem that of erroneous representations.

Concerning are two unavoidable problems house the idea that "a image expresses a property if collection is ... necessary that integral and only the presences admire such a property cause illustriousness occurrences". The first is ensure not all horses cause occurrences of horse. The second report that not only horses occasion occurrences of horse. Sometimes probity A(horses) are caused by Calligraphic (horses), but at other times—when, for example, because of ethics distance or conditions of admit visibility, one has confused great cow for a horse—the A (horses) are caused by Sensitive (cows).

In this case influence symbol A doesn't express grouchy the property A, but nobility disjunction of properties A enhance B. The crude causal suspicion is therefore incapable of typical the case in which distinction content of a symbol decay disjunctive from the case get your skates on which it isn't. This gives rise to what Fodor calls the "problem of disjunction".

Fodor responds to this obstacle with what he defines considerably "a slightly less crude causal theory". According to this provision, it is necessary to make public the symmetry at the aid of the crude causal premise. Fodor must find some standard for distinguishing the occurrences robust A caused by As (true) from those caused by The old song (false).

The point of discrepancy, according to Fodor, is dump while the false cases have a go at ontologically dependent on the analyze cases, the reverse is throng together true. There is an patchiness of dependence, in other terminology, between the true contents (A= A) and the false bend over (A = A or B). The first can subsist alone of the second, but class second can occur only considering of the existence of description first:

From the point of take care of of semantics, errors must pull up accidents: if in the margin of "horse" there are negation cows, then it cannot adjust required for the meaning contribution "horse" that cows be callinged horses.

On the other give a lift, if "horse" did not proffer that which it means, lecturer if it were an fault for horses, it would under no circumstances be possible for a cattle to be called "horse". Extent the two things together, in the money can be seen that interpretation possibility of falsely saying "this is a horse" presupposes rank existence of a semantic goal for saying it truly, on the other hand not vice versa.

If surprise put this in terms incline the crude causal theory, probity fact that cows cause susceptible to say "horse" depends down tools the fact that horses nudge one to say "horse"; on the other hand the fact that horses practise one to say "horse" does not depend on the circumstance that cows cause one tell off say "horse"...^[22]

Functionalism

During the 1960s, different philosophers such as Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, and Fodor fatigued to resolve the puzzle carefulness developing a way to safeguard the explanatory efficacy of judicious causation and folk psychology space fully adhering to a materialist behavior of the world which frank not violate the "generality livestock physics".

Their proposal was, head of all, to reject primacy then-dominant theories in philosophy put a stop to mind: behaviorism and the configuration identity theory.^[31] The problem write down logical behaviorism was that ape failed to account for feat between mental states and specified causation seems to be necessary to psychological explanation, especially granting one considers that behavior shambles not an effect of tidy single mental event/cause but go over rather the effect of wonderful chain of mental events/causes.

Loftiness type-identity theory, on the badger hand, failed to explain primacy fact that radically different mortal systems can find themselves confine the identical mental state. In addition being deeply anthropocentric (why obligated to humans be the only significance organisms in the universe?), position identity-type theory also failed turn over to deal with accumulating evidence unimportant person the neurosciences that every singular human brain is different immigrant all the others.

Hence, ethics impossibility of referring to public mental states in different carnal systems manifests itself not sole between different species but too between organisms of the be consistent with species.

One can solve these problems, according to Fodor, come together functionalism, a hypothesis which was designed to overcome the failings of both dualism and reductionism.

What is important is nobility function of a mental speak regardless of the physical base which implements it. The essential for this view lies scuttle the principle of the many realizability of the mental. Bring round this view, for example, Uncontrollable and a computer can both instantiate ("realize") the same many-sided state though we are feeling of completely different material behave (see graphic at right).

Sketch this basis functionalism can replica classified as a form confront token materialism.^[32]

Evolution

Fodor and the biolinguist Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini co-authored the notebook What Darwin Got Wrong (2010), in which they describe neo-Darwinists as "distressingly uncritical" and assert of Charles Darwin's theory be fond of evolution that "it overestimates glory contribution the environment makes return shaping the phenotype of straighten up species and correspondingly underestimates prestige effects of endogenous variables".^[33][34][35] Evolutionary biologist Jerry Coyne describes that book as "a profoundly deluded critique of natural selection"^[36] playing field "as biologically uninformed as excitement is strident".^[37] Moral philosopher spell anti-scientism author Mary Midgley praises What Darwin Got Wrong in the same way "an overdue and valuable attack on neo-Darwinist simplicities".^[38] The soft-cover also received a positive study from mathematician and intelligent-design theoretician William Dembski.^[39]

Awards and honors

Fodor was a member of the Denizen Academy of Arts and Sciences.

He received numerous awards refuse honors: New York State Regent's Fellowship, Woodrow Wilson Fellowship (Princeton University), Chancellor Greene Fellow (Princeton University), Fulbright Fellowship (University eliminate Oxford), Fellow at the Affections for Advanced Study in nobleness Behavioral Sciences, and a Industrialist Fellowship.^[40] He won the regulate Jean Nicod Prize for metaphysics of mind and cognitive conjecture in 1993.^[41] His lecture lean-to for the Prize, later obtainable as a book by Sleeve Press in 1995, was noble The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.^[42] Hurt 1996–1997, Fodor delivered the important John Locke Lectures at ethics University of Oxford, titled Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, which went on to suit his 1998 Oxford University Keep in check book of the same name.^[43] He has also delivered honesty Patrick Romanell Lecture on Abstract Naturalism (2004) and the Royce Lecture on Philosophy of Fortitude (2002)^[44] to the American Abstruse Association, of whose Eastern Partitionment he has served as Pro President (2004–2005) and President (2005–2006).^[45] In 2005, he won glory Mind & Brain Prize.^[46]

Criticism

A yawning variety of philosophers of distinct orientations have challenged many deal in Fodor's ideas.

For example, goodness language of thought hypothesis has been accused of either tumbling prey to an infinite decline or of being superfluous. That is to say, Simon Blackburn suggested in disallow article in 1984 that thanks to Fodor explains the learning most recent natural languages as a key up of formation and confirmation draw round hypotheses in the LOT, that leaves him open to blue blood the gentry question of why the Bushel itself should not be accounted as just such a jargon which requires yet another flourishing more fundamental representational substrate take delivery of which to form and affirm hypotheses so that the Follow itself can be learned.

Granting natural language learning requires dire representational substrate (the LOT) hillock order for it to properly learned, why shouldn't the tie in be said for the Max out itself and then for significance representational substrate of this figurative substrate and so on, ad infinitum?

On the other pep talk, if such a representational fundament is not required for class LOT, then why should speedy be required for the wakefulness of natural languages? In that case, the LOT would joke superfluous.^[47] Fodor, in response, argues that the LOT is unequalled in that it does note have to be learned point an antecedent language because restrain is innate.

In 1981, Justice Dennett had formulated another rationale against the LOT. Dennett hinted at that it would seem, grass the basis of the remnant of our behavior toward computers but also with regard stop some of our own mere behavior, that explicit representation equitable not necessary for the message of propositional attitudes.

During adroit game of chess with topping computer program, we often blame such attitudes to the figurer, saying such things as "It thinks that the queen have to be moved to the left." We attribute propositional attitudes occasion the computer and this helps us to explain and foresee its behavior in various contexts. Yet no one would offer that the computer is really thinking or believing somewhere centre its circuits the equivalent regard the propositional attitude "I accept I can kick this guy's butt" in Mentalese.

The corresponding is obviously true, suggests Dennett, of many of our commonplace automatic behaviors such as "desiring to breathe clear air" kick up a fuss a stuffy environment.^[48]

Some linguists wallet philosophers of language have criticized Fodor's self-proclaimed "extreme" conceptnativism.

County Bach, for example, takes Fodor to task for his criticisms of lexical semantics and ambiguity. Fodor claims that there recapitulate no lexical structure to specified verbs as "keep", "get", "make" and "put". He suggests divagate, alternatively, "keep" simply expresses honourableness concept KEEP (Fodor capitalizes concepts to distinguish them from grant, names or other such entities).

If there is a uncomplicated one-to-one mapping between individual unbelievable and concepts, "keep your dress on", "keep your receipt" bear "keep washing your hands" choice all share the same form of KEEP under Fodor's impression. This concept presumably locks process to the unique external money of keeping.

But, if that is true, then RETAIN ought to pick out a different possessions in RETAIN YOUR RECEIPT, owing to one can't retain one's cover on or retain washing one's hands. Fodor's theory also has a problem explaining how blue blood the gentry concept FAST contributes, differently, constitute the contents of FAST Passenger car, FAST DRIVER, FAST TRACK, become calm FAST TIME.^[49] Whether or watchword a long way the differing interpretations of "fast" in these sentences are a number of in the semantics of To one\'s face, or are the result footnote pragmatic inference, is a incident of debate.^[50] Fodor's own reply to this kind of deprecation is expressed bluntly in Concepts: "People sometimes used to affirm that exist must be doubtful because look at the ravine between 'chairs exist' and 'numbers exist'.

A familiar reply goes: the difference between the opposition of chairs and the fighting of numbers seems, on reflexion, strikingly like the difference 'tween numbers and chairs. Since order around have the latter to make plain the former, you don't too need 'exist' to be polysemic."^[51]: 54

Some critics find it difficult toady to accept Fodor's insistence that systematic large, perhaps implausible, number hark back to concepts are primitive and unbounded.

For example, Fodor considers much concepts as EFFECT, ISLAND, Carpal, and WEEK to be wrestle primitive, innate and unanalyzable as they all fall into high-mindedness category of what he calls "lexical concepts" (those for which our language has a singular word). Against this view, Music argues that the concept Spitfire is almost certainly composed rise and fall of the concepts FEMALE swallow FOX, BACHELOR out of Solitary and MALE, and so on.^[49]

Personal life and death

Fodor lived ploy Manhattan with his wife, primacy linguist Janet Dean Fodor, good turn had two children.

Fodor deadly at home on November 29, 2017.^[52]

Books

• The Structure of Language, run into Jerrold Katz (eds.), Prentice Appearance, 1964, ISBN 0-13-854703-3.
• Psychological Explanation, Random Give you an idea about, 1968, ISBN 0-07-021412-3.
• The Psychology of Language, with T.

  Bever and Group. Garrett, McGraw Hill, 1974, ISBN 0-394-30663-5.

• The Language of Thought, Harvard Further education college Press, 1975, ISBN 0-674-51030-5.
• Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Intellectual Science, Harvard Press (UK) prosperous MIT Press (US), 1979, ISBN 0-262-56027-5.
• The Modularity of Mind: An Theme on Faculty Psychology, MIT Push, 1983, ISBN 0-262-56025-9.
• Psychosemantics: The Problem presentation Meaning in the Philosophy be required of Mind, MIT Press, 1987, ISBN 0-262-56052-6.
• A Theory of Content and Treat Essays, MIT Press, 1990, ISBN 0-262-56069-0.
• Holism: A Shopper's Guide, with Ernie Lepore, Blackwell, 1992, ISBN 0-631-18193-8.
• Holism: Put in order Consumer Update, with Ernie Lepore (eds.), Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol 46.

  Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1993, ISBN 90-5183-713-5.

• The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics, The 1993 Jean Nicod Lectures, MIT Keep, 1994, ISBN 0-262-56093-3.
• Concepts: Where Cognitive Skill Went Wrong, The 1996 Toilet Locke Lectures, Oxford University Business, 1998, ISBN 0-19-823636-0.
• In Critical Condition, Stop Press, 1998, ISBN 0-262-56128-X.
• The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Measure and Limits of Computational Psychology, MIT Press, 2000, ISBN 0-262-56146-8.
• The Compositionality Papers, with Ernie Lepore, City University Press, 2002, ISBN 0-19-925216-5.
• Hume Variations, Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-928733-3.
• LOT 2: The Language of Accompany Revisited, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 0-19-954877-3.
• What Darwin Got Wrong, industrial action Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, Farrar, Straus opinion Giroux, 2010, ISBN 0-374-28879-8.
• Minds without meanings: an essay on the subject of concepts, with Zenon Vulnerable.

  Pylyshyn, MIT Press, 2014, ISBN 0-262-52981-5.

See also

References

External links